Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual imagery and abstract thoughts
Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual imagery and abstract thoughts
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/s0167-8760(97)00098-6
复制
发表时间：
1998-06-01
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Koukkou, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lehmann, D;Strik, WK;Koukkou, M
以无输入、无任务、无响应范式收集自发、有意识经历回忆的提示报告（向 13 名健康志愿者每人提供 30 次随机提示）。心理报告分为视觉意象和抽象思维。自发的 19 通道脑电活动 (EEG) 被连续记录，被视为脑电场的一系列瞬时空间分布（图），并被分割成微观状态，即分割成以电位分布图的准稳定景观为特征的时间段，这些电位分布图显示出亚秒范围内的不同持续时间。微观状态分割使用数据驱动策略。不同的微观状态，即不同的脑电景观一定是由不同神经组件的活动产生的，因此被假设构成不同的功能。两种类型的报告体验与提示之前显着不同的微观状态（平均持续时间 121 毫秒）相关；这些微观状态显示，对于抽象思维（与视觉图像相比），各个受试者的电重心向左移动以及场轴顺时针旋转。相反，提示前 2 秒的微观状态在两种类型的体验之间没有差异。结果支持这样的假设：在电场中识别的大脑的不同微观状态实现了不同的有意识的、可报告的心理状态，即不同类别（类型）的思想（心理状态）；因此，微观状态可能是“思想原子”的候选者。 (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
Prompted reports of recall of spontaneous, conscious experiences were collected in a no-input, no-task, no-response paradigm (30 random prompts to each of 13 healthy volunteers). The mentation reports were classified into visual imagery and abstract thought. Spontaneous 19-channel brain electric activity (EEG) was continuously recorded, viewed as series of momentary spatial distributions (maps) of the brain electric field and segmented into microstates, i.e. into time segments characterized by quasi-stable landscapes of potential distribution maps which showed varying durations in the sub-second range. Microstate segmentation used a data-driven strategy. Different microstates, i.e. different brain electric landscapes must have been generated by activity of different neural assemblies and therefore are hypothesized to constitute different functions. The two types of reported experiences were associated with significantly different microstates (mean duration 121 ms) immediately preceding the prompts; these microstates showed, across subjects, for abstract thought (compared to visual imagery) a shift of the electric gravity center to the left and a clockwise rotation of the field axis. Contrariwise, the microstates 2 s before the prompt did not differ between the two types of experiences. The results support the hypothesis that different microstates of the brain as recognized in its electric field implement different conscious, reportable mind states, i.e. different classes (types) of thoughts (mentations); thus,,the microstates might be candidates for the 'atoms of thought'. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.