A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free‐Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering
A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free‐Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering
复制标题
自由驱动外部性治理的投票架构及其在地球工程中的应用
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Weitzman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Weitzman
减缓气候变化是一个具有典型“搭便车”结构的巨大国际公共产品问题。然而，这也是一个全球性的“自由驾驶”问题，因为地球工程平流层与反射粒子阻挡入射的太阳辐射是如此便宜，它基本上可以由一个国家单方面采取认为自己处于危险之中。这篇探索性的论文在一个简单的模型中发展了自由驾驶外部性的主要特征，该模型由I型和II型错误的不对称后果驱动。我提出了一个社会选择的决策架构，体现了解决方案的概念，一个超级多数表决规则，并得出其基本属性。
Abating climate change is an enormous international public-goods problem with a classical “free-rider” structure. However, it is also a global “free-driver” problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril. This exploratory paper develops the main features of a free-driver externality in a simple model motivated by the asymmetric consequences of type-I and type-II errors. I propose a social-choice decision architecture, embodying the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule, and derive its basic properties.