The Organizational Foundations of Democratic Accountability: Organizational Form and the Choice of Electoral Linkage Strategy
The Organizational Foundations of Democratic Accountability: Organizational Form and the Choice of Electoral Linkage Strategy
复制标题
民主问责的组织基础：组织形式与选举联系策略的选择
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Kselman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Herbert P. Kitschelt;D. Kselman
在民主选举中，政党和/或候选人个人向公民提供一些政策承诺、物质利益和象征性暗示的组合，以换取他们希望获得的选票、劳动力、竞选捐款等。将这种交换关系定义为民主联系，并将政党选择的交换机制组合定义为联系策略。本文的中心理论主张是，一个政党的组织形式将影响其能力，以减轻不同的“承包”问题，伴随着客户，而不是方案的联系战略。我们操作和测试我们的期望，以组织形式和联系战略之间的关系与一个新出现的数据集在88个国家的党组织和民主问责制的模式。总的来说，具有“非正式”地方网络和融资做法的中央组织非常适合维持客户名单合同。相比之下，方案呼吁往往得到拥有广泛正式基础设施的分权组织的最佳支持，尽管分权对方案效力的影响因政党规模而异。
In democratic elections, political parties and/or individual candidates offer citizens some mix of policy promises, material benefits, and symbolic cues, in exchange for which they hope to secure votes, labor, campaign contributions, etc. Define such exchange relations as democratic linkages, and define a political party’s chosen mix of exchange mechanisms as its linkage strategy. This paper’s central theoretical claim is that a political party’s organizational form will influence its ability to mitigate the distinct ‘contracting’ problems which accompany clientelist as opposed to programmatic linkage strategies. We operationalize and test our expectations as to the relationship between organizational form and linkage strategy with a newly emerging dataset on patterns of party organization and democratic accountability in 88 countries. On the whole, centralized organizations with ‘non-formalized’ local networks and financing practices are well-suited to the maintenance of clientelist contracts. In contrast, programmatic appeals tend to be best supported by decentralized organizations with extensive formal infrastructure, although the consequences of decentralization for programmatic effectiveness vary according to a party’s size.