Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion specificity.
Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion specificity.
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DOI：
10.1037//0022-3514.78.3.397
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发表时间：
2000-03
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
David DeSteno;R. Petty;D. Wegener;Derek D. Rucker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David DeSteno;R. Petty;D. Wegener;Derek D. Rucker
积极和消极的情绪已经被证明可以增加对未来事件的可能性估计，这些事件在效价上与这些状态相匹配（例如，E.约翰逊和A. Tversky，1983）。在本文中，4项研究提供的证据表明，这种一致性偏见（a）不仅限于效价，但在情绪特定的方式功能，（B）来自情绪的信息价值，（c）是不可避免的结果，可能性评估下情绪高涨。具体来说，研究1表明，悲伤和愤怒，2个不同的，消极的情绪，差异偏见的可能性估计悲伤和愤怒的事件。研究2和3除了支持情感作为信息（参见第10章）之外，还重复了这一发现。N.施瓦茨& G. L. Clore，1983年），而不是基于记忆的，中介过程的偏见。最后，研究4表明，当情绪的来源是突出的，偏见的逆转可以发生更大的认知努力，旨在准确性。
Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson & A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (a) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (b) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (c) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz & G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy.