The German apprenticeship system
The German apprenticeship system
复制标题
德国的学徒制
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Soskice
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Franz;D. Soskice
本文研究的是德国的学徒制培训制度。我们首先描述了该系统的运行情况，包括供求和成本方面的统计图表；职业培训和教育系统之间的关系；从事学徒培训的公司必须遵守的复杂法规；以及相关机构。然后，我们将重点放在为什么许多公司在有市场的技能上进行大量净投资的问题上。本文提出了两个简单的观点，作为对公司行为的至少部分和补充解释。首先，向外部雇佣的具有市场技能的员工传授特定于公司的技能的成本要高得多。第二种想法试图抓住这样一种信念，即公司认为学徒制是一种竞争，如果公司想要获得最好的毕业生，就必须参与其中。
This paper deals with the German apprenticeship training system. We first set the scene by describing the operation of the system, including the statistical picture in terms of supply and demand and costs; the relationship between the vocational training and the educational systems; the complex of regulations which companies engaging in apprenticeship training have to respect; and the relevant institutions. We then focus on the question why many companies make substantial net investments in marketable skills. Two simple ideas are developed as at least partial and complementary explanations of company' behaviour. The first is that it is significantly more expensive to teach company - specific skills to externally hired workers with marketable skills. The second idea tries to capture the belief that companies have that the apprenticeship system is some sort of competiton which companies have to go in for if they are to receive the best school leavers.