A First-Order Logic of Limited Belief Based on Possible Worlds
A First-Order Logic of Limited Belief Based on Possible Worlds
复制标题
基于可能世界的有限信念的一阶逻辑
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Levesque
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Lakemeyer;H. Levesque
在最近的一篇论文中，Lakmeyer和Levesque提出了一种有限信念的一阶逻辑来刻画知识库(KB)的信念。在其他方面，他们表明他们的信仰模型是有表现力的，最终是完整的，并且容易处理。粗略地说，这意味着一个知识库可能由任意的一阶句子组成，在给予足够的推理努力的情况下，知识库逻辑上蕴含的任何句子最终都会被相信，而且这种推理在合理的假设下是容易处理的。该提议的一个缺点是，认知状态是根据可能包含变量的子句集来定义的，与认知逻辑文献中发现的更传统的可能世界语义学相比，这赋予了逻辑独特的句法风格。在本文中，我们证明了通过将认知态定义为三值可能世界的集合，可以获得与上述相同的性质。这样，我们就能够通过使用更熟悉的关于可能世界的真理的概念来重新塑造这些属性，从而揭示出新的曙光。
In a recent paper Lakemeyer and Levesque proposed a first-order logic of limited belief to characterize the beliefs of a knowledge base (KB). Among other things, they show that their model of belief is expressive, eventually complete, and tractable. This means, roughly, that a KB may consist of arbitrary first-order sentences, that any sentence which is logically entailed by the KB is eventually believed, given enough reasoning effort, and that reasoning is tractable under reasonable assumptions. One downside of the proposal is that epistemic states are defined in terms of sets of clauses, possibly containing variables, giving the logic a distinct syntactic flavour compared to the more traditional possible-world semantics found in the literature on epistemic logic. In this paper we show that the same properties as above can be obtained by defining epistemic states as sets of three-valued possible worlds. This way we are able to shed new light on those properties by recasting them using the more familiar notion of truth over possible worlds.