Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners’ dilemma game
Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners’ dilemma game
复制标题
重复囚徒困境博弈中记忆-两种策略形成对称互强化学习均衡
DOI：
10.1016/j.amc.2022.127819
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Ueda Masahiko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yanaka Hitomi;Mineshima Koji;Inui Kentaro;Masashi Tsubaki and Teruyasu Mizoguchi;Haoran Xie;Ueda Masahiko
当两个玩家在重复的囚徒困境游戏中交替学习针对对手的最佳记忆两种策略时，我们研究了相互强化学习的对称均衡。我们提供了记忆的必要条件——两种确定性策略形成对称均衡。然后，我们提供了三个记忆示例 - 两种确定性策略，形成对称的相互强化学习平衡。我们还证明，当两个玩家都使用记忆n策略的强化学习且n>2时，记忆两种策略形成的互强化学习均衡也是互强化学习均衡。
We investigate symmetric equilibria of mutual reinforcement learning when both players alternately learn the optimal memory-two strategies against the opponent in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. We provide a necessary condition for memory-two deterministic strategies to form symmetric equilibria. We then provide three examples of memory-two deterministic strategies which form symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibria. We also prove that mutual reinforcement learning equilibria formed by memory-two strategies are also mutual reinforcement learning equilibria when both players use reinforcement learning of memory-n strategies with n> 2.