“The Public Interest” in Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory?
“The Public Interest” in Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory?
复制标题
行政决策中的“公共利益”：定理、神智还是理论？
DOI：
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发表时间：
1957
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
G. Schubert,
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Schubert,
公共行政教科书通常以有关行政责任的章节作为结尾。仁慈的推论是，这个位置象征着把最好的留到最后，而不是事后才想到的附属品。赫伯特·考夫曼可能将其解释为上一代政治学家的全神贯注于使行政权力的有效行使合法化以促进社会国家的目标，从而使新出现的大型专业化官僚机构的控制问题得到升华。不管怎样，似乎很清楚的是，除了对“公民自由”产生不利影响的行政决定之外，大多数政治学家都满足于让律师和自由企业制度的捍卫者担心行政行为的限制。
Textbooks in public administration customarily conclude with a section on administrative responsibility. The charitable inference is that this location betokens the saving of the best till last, rather than the appendage of an afterthought. Herbert Kaufman might explain it as the preoccupation of the past generation of political scientists with the legitimation of the efficient exercise of administrative power to subserve the goals of the social state, with a consequent sublimation of the emerging problem of the control of large, professionalized bureaucracies. However that may be, it does seem clear that, with the exception of administrative decisions which adversely affect “civil liberties,” most political scientists have been content to let lawyers and defenders of the free enterprise system worry about the restraint of administrative action.