The Sublime Dissociation of the Past: Or How to Be(come) What One Is No Longer
The Sublime Dissociation of the Past: Or How to Be(come) What One Is No Longer
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过去的崇高分离：或者如何成为（成为）一个人不再是的人
DOI：
10.1111/0018-2656.00170
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
F. Ankersmit
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Ankersmit
历史理论很少研究遗忘。尽管它吸引了理论家们的注意，但遗忘通常被认为是我们与过去关系中的一个缺陷，应该以某种方式克服。唯一的例外是尼采，他在《论历史的使用和滥用》（1874）中极力歌颂遗忘。但尼采的概念是一贯的历史主义的牺牲品，因此需要修正。在这篇文章中，我们确定了四种类型的遗忘。文章的中心论点是第四种类型。这是一种遗忘，当一个文明通过用一个新的身份交换以前的身份而“自杀”时。黑格尔对苏格拉底和雅典国家之间冲突的动人描述，被视为这种遗忘的典型例子。从对这种类型的遗忘的分析中可以得出两个结论。首先，我们现在可以理解什么应该被认为是文明的历史崇高，以及历史崇高和集体创伤的概念是如何联系在一起的。第二，神话与（科学）历史并不相互排斥;相反，（科学）历史创造了神话。这不应该被视为历史的缺陷，因为这正是它应该如何。
Forgetting has rarely been investigated in historical theory. Insofar as it attracted the attention of theorists at all, forgetting has ordinarily been considered to be a defect in our relationship to the past that should be overcome in one way or another. The only exception is Nietzsche who so provocatively sung the praises of forgetting in his On the Use and Abuse of History (1874). But Nietzsche’s conception is the easy victim of a consistent historicism and therefore in need of correction. Four types of forgetting are identified in this essay. Central in the essay’s argument is the fourth type. This is the kind of forgetting taking place when a civilization “commits suicide” by exchanging a previous identity for a new one. Hegel’s moving account of the conflict between Socrates and the Athenian state is presented as the paradigmatic example of this kind of forgetting. Two conclusions follow from an analysis of this type of forgetting. First, we can now understand what should be recognized as a civilization’s historical sublime and how the notions of the historical sublime and of collective trauma are related. Second, it follows that myth and (scientific) history do not exclude each other; on the contrary, (scientific) history creates myth. This should not be taken to be a defect of history, for this is precisely how it should be.