'Theory of mind' and tracking speakers' intentions
'Theory of mind' and tracking speakers' intentions
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DOI：
10.1111/1468-0017.00187
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发表时间：
2002-02-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Loth, E
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Happé, F;Loth, E
典型的心智理论任务评估儿童为了预测或解释一个行为而将错误信念归因的能力。根据这些标准任务，幼儿在四岁之前不会代表他人的独立（错误）信念——但在这之前很久，孩子们就能够追踪说话人的意图，以便学习新单词。交流可能是心智理论的特权领域吗？在本研究中，我们探讨了学龄前儿童为了获得一个新单词而追踪错误信念的能力。一个木偶在错误信念条件下给一个新物体贴上标签（盒子里的东西在她不知情的情况下被调换了），另一个是真实信念条件下（盒子里的东西在她在场的情况下被调换了）。孩子们在单词学习任务中比在标准的错误信念测试中更善于追踪木偶的错误信念。讨论了这种优势的可能原因，并提出心理状态的表征可能在沟通服务中过早出现。
Typical theory of mind tasks assess children's ability to attribute a false belief in order to predict or explain an action. According to these standard tasks, young children do not represent the independent (mistaken) beliefs of others until the fourth year-yet long before this, children are able to track speakers' intentions in order to learn new words. Might communication be a privileged domain for theory of mind? In the present study we explored pre-schoolers' ability to track a false belief in order to acquire a novel word. A puppet labeled a novel object in a false belief condition (contents of a box had been switched without her knowledge), and a true belief condition (contents switched in her presence). Children were significantly better at tracking the puppet's false belief in the word-learning task than in a standard false belief test. Possible reasons for this advantage are discussed, and the suggestion made that representation of mental states may emerge precociously in the service of communication.