Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried
Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried
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为什么左翼自由主义并非语无伦次、不确定或无关紧要：对弗里德的回复
DOI：
10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00030.x
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
M. Otsuka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Vallentyne;H. Steiner;M. Otsuka
在过去的几十年里，人们对左翼自由主义的兴趣与日俱增，该理论认为(大致)代理人完全拥有自己，自然资源(土地、矿产、空气等)在某种平等主义意义上属于每个人。左派自由主义同意更常见的右派自由主义关于自我所有权的观点，但在获得自然资源所有权的权力方面与左派自由主义截然不同。自由主义坚持认为，仅仅是第一个声称、发现或将劳动力与未被占用的自然资源混合在一起的人，并不会在这种自然资源中产生完全的私人财产权。左翼自由主义似乎很有希望，因为它既承认强烈的个人自由和安全权利，也支持对某种物质平等的强烈要求。这似乎是一种貌似合理的自由平等主义形式。在最近一篇关于左翼自由主义的两卷本选集(由我们两人编辑)的评论文章中，芭芭拉·弗里德精辟地列出了左翼自由主义面临的大多数核心问题1我们都是左翼自由主义者，我们想借此机会解决她提出的一些一般性问题。我们将像弗里德在很多时候所做的那样，关注左翼自由主义是否是现有形式的自由平等主义的明确和独特的替代。更具体地说，我们将解决弗里德(和其他人)提出的以下基本问题：(1)自我所有权的概念是否有任何确定的内容？(2)自我所有权和世界所有权之间的关系是什么？(3)左翼自由主义与其他形式的自由平等主义(例如，罗尔斯和德沃金的那些)有什么不同？然而，首先，我们将通过提供一些关于左翼自由主义的一般背景来设定背景。
Over the past few decades, there has been increasing interest in left- libertarianism, which holds (roughly) that agents fully own themselves and that natural resources (land, minerals, air, and the like) belong to everyone in some egalitarian sense. Left-libertarianism agrees with the more familiar right-libertarianism about self-ownership, but radically disagrees with it about the power to acquire ownership of natural resources. Merely being the first person to claim, discover, or mix labor with an unappropriated natural resource does not—left-libertarianism insists—generate a full private property right in that natural resource. Left-libertarianism seems promising because it recognizes both strong individual rights of liberty and security and also grounds a strong demand for some kind of material equality. It seems, that is, to be a plausible a form of liberal egalitarianism. In a recent review essay of a two-volume anthology on left-libertarianism (edited by two of us), Barbara Fried has insightfully laid out most of the core issues that confront left-libertarianism.1 We are each left-libertarians, and we would like to take this opportunity to address some of the general issues that she raises. We shall focus, as Fried does much of the time, on the question of whether left-libertarianism is a well-defined and distinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitarianism. More specifically, we shall address the following fundamental issues raised by Fried (and others): (1) Does the notion of self-ownership have any determinate content? (2) What is the relation between self-ownership and world ownership? (3) How is left-libertarianism different from other forms of liberal egalitarianism (e.g., those of Rawls and Dworkin)? First, however, we shall set the context by providing some general background on left-libertarianism.