Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets
Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets
复制标题
双寡头市场中内生信息获取和披露的福利效应
DOI：
10.1080/09638180.2019.1615969
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Kazunori Miwa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
日本心理学会;米田 英嗣;和田 裕一;福田怜生;猪股健太郎・藤井豪・橋本翔・片平建史・長田 典子・浅野隆・河崎圭吾・荷方邦夫;猪股健太郎・山本晃輔・荷方邦夫;猪股健太郎・西田尚生・長田典子・正田真利恵・穴田徳光・段家加生里・宝珠山秀雄・藤縄展宏;猪股健太郎・長田典子;田部渓哉;田部渓哉;田部渓哉;田部渓哉;Kazunori Miwa
本文研究了需求不确定性条件下古诺双寡头市场中企业信息获取决策与内部获取信息披露的互动关系。主要结果如下：当企业需求之间的相关性为正且足够高时，在企业私有信息质量不变的情况下，披露需求不确定性信息可以提高社会福利。然而，在企业私人信息是内生决定的情况下，强制披露并不总是可取的。这是因为，与未披露获得的信息相比，强制披露时，公司获得的信息不那么精确；因此，他们的内部信息环境恶化。这可能导致意想不到的后果，比如信息披露法规会降低社会福利。
This paper investigates the interaction between firms' information acquisition decisions and disclosure of internally acquired information in a Cournot duopoly market under demand uncertainty. The main results are as follows. When the correlation between firms' demands is positive and sufficiently high, disclosure of information on demand uncertainty can enhance social welfare, given that the quality of firms' private information is constant. However, in the setting where firms' private information is endogenously determined, mandatory disclosure is not always desirable. This is because, when disclosure is mandated, firms acquire less precise information compared with the case where the acquired information is not disclosed; hence, their internal information environments are deteriorated. This can lead to unintended consequences such that disclosure regulation decreases social welfare.