An experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games
An experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games
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DOI：
10.1016/j.physa.2016.06.108
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发表时间：
2016-12-01
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Hanaki，Nobuyuki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yamada，Takashi;Hanaki，Nobuyuki
摘要我们通过实验研究了最低唯一性博弈（LUIGs），以确定受试者是否以及如何自组织成不同的行为类别。在LUIG中，N（≥ 3）个玩家提交一个直到M的正整数，选择最小的数字的玩家获胜。LUIGs是真实的系统的简化版本，如最低/最高唯一出价拍卖，一直吸引着学者的注意，但实验研究是稀缺的。此外，LUIGs提供的选择模式，可以揭示缓解拥堵问题的见解。这里，我们考虑N={3，4}和M={3，4}的四个LUIG。我们发现：（a）超过1/3的受试者做出的选择与对称混合策略纳什均衡（MSE）预测的结果没有显著差异;然而，（B）行为与MSE预测的结果显著不同的受试者赢得游戏的频率更高。区别受试者的是他们在失败后改变选择的倾向。
Abstract We experimentally study Lowest Unique Integer Games (LUIGs) to determine if and how subjects self-organize into different behavioral classes. In a LUIG, N (≥ 3) players submit a positive integer up to M and the player choosing the smallest number not chosen by anyone else wins. LUIGs are simplified versions of real systems such as Lowest/Highest Unique Bid Auctions that have been attracting attention from scholars, yet experimental studies are scarce. Furthermore, LUIGs offer insights into choice patterns that can shed light on the alleviation of congestion problems. Here, we consider four LUIGs with N={3, 4} and M={3, 4}. We find that (a) choices made by more than 1/3 of subjects were not significantly different from what a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) predicts; however,(b) subjects who behaved significantly differently from what the MSE predicts won the game more frequently. What distinguishes subjects was their tendencies to change their choices following losses.