Withdrawing from Investment Treaties but Protecting Investment
Withdrawing from Investment Treaties but Protecting Investment
复制标题
退出投资条约但保护投资
DOI：
10.1111/1758-5899.12355
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
R. Wellhausen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Clint Peinhardt;R. Wellhausen
跨国公司可以起诉政府的投资者-国家争端解决机制（ISDS）遭到强烈反对，导致一些国家单方面退出了数千项促进ISDS的投资条约。但由于密集、分散的投资条约网络存在冗余，各国可以拒绝对ISDS的一些条约承诺，并维持对外国投资者的大部分（如果不是全部的话）国际法律的保护。在这篇文章中，我们解释了冗余的来源，记录了利用单方面退出的国家集团，并表明国家可以重新调整其国际法律的承诺，而不回避当代国际投资法。
A backlash against Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), in which multinational corporations can sue governments, has led some states to unilaterally withdraw from some of the thousands of investment treaties that facilitate ISDS. But thanks to redundancies in the dense, decentralized network of investment treaties, states can reject some treaty commitments to ISDS and maintain most (if not all) international legal protections for foreign investors. In this article, we explain the source of redundancies, document the group of states that have taken advantage of unilateral withdrawal, and demonstrate that states can recalibrate their international legal commitments without eschewing contemporary international investment law.