Modified Matrix Completion-Based Detection of Stealthy Data Manipulation Attacks in Low Observable Distribution Systems
Modified Matrix Completion-Based Detection of Stealthy Data Manipulation Attacks in Low Observable Distribution Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2023.3266834
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发表时间：
2023-11
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
J. Rajasekaran;B. Natarajan;A. Pahwa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Rajasekaran;B. Natarajan;A. Pahwa
本文针对低可观测性的配电网络开发了一种针对隐秘数据操纵的复合检测技术。攻击检测策略通常依赖于状态估计，当可用的测量有限时，状态估计就变得具有挑战性。在本文中，改进的矩阵完成方法提供了对网络中无法进行测量的位置的系统状态及其误差方差的估计。使用错误统计及其相应的状态估计，可以使用卡方检验来执行不良数据检测。所提出的方法采用移动目标防御策略（MTD），其中通过分布式灵活交流传输系统（D-FACTS）设备扰动网络参数，从而可以以不良数据的形式暴露隐秘的数据操纵攻击。因此，本文开发的不良数据检测方法可以使用 MTD 策略检测隐秘攻击。该技术在 37 总线和 123 总线三相不平衡配电网络上实施，以证明即使对于低可观测系统也能实现攻击检测的准确性。
A composite detection technique against stealthy data manipulations is developed in this paper for distribution networks that are low observable. Attack detection strategies typically rely on state estimation which becomes challenging when limited measurements are available. In this paper, a modified matrix completion approach provides estimates of the system state and its error variances for the locations in the network where measurements are unavailable. Using the error statistics and their corresponding state estimates, bad data detection can be carried out using the chi-squared test. The proposed approach employs a moving target defence strategy (MTD) where the network parameters are perturbed through distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices such that stealthy data manipulation attacks can be exposed in the form of bad data. Thus, the bad data detection approach developed in this paper can detect stealthy attacks using the MTD strategy. This technique is implemented on 37-bus and 123-bus three-phase unbalanced distribution networks to demonstrate the attack detection accuracy even for a low observable system.