Financing decisions in supply chains with a capital-constrained manufacturer: competition and risk
Financing decisions in supply chains with a capital-constrained manufacturer: competition and risk
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资本有限的制造商的供应链融资决策：竞争与风险
DOI：
10.1111/itor.12670
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发表时间：
2020-09-01
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Li, Qingying
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shen, Bin;Wang, Xin;Li, Qingying
供应链金融是一个至关重要的话题。在本文中，我们考虑了资本受限的制造商可以从银行(银行信贷融资)或零售商(贸易信贷融资)借钱。我们的分析比较了这两种融资方案下的供应链绩效。此外，我们扩展了我们的模型来评估零售竞争和供应链成员的风险规避对由一个资金受限的制造商和两个竞争的零售商组成的供应链的影响。我们考虑了三种融资方案：纯银行信贷融资、双重贸易信贷融资和银行与贸易信贷混合融资。我们发现，在没有零售竞争的情况下，零售商总是愿意使用商业信贷融资；而在零售竞争中，如果一个零售商提供商业信贷，而另一个零售商不提供，则信贷提供者可以获得更高的利润。因此，提供一个合适的贸易信贷融资方案对零售商来说至关重要。此外，我们还发现，在没有零售竞争的情况下，当贸易利率较低时，零售商和制造商都可以在贸易信贷融资中达到双赢。然而，在零售竞争的情况下，供应链成员(即两个零售商和一个制造商)无论采用哪种具体的融资方案，都不会有双赢的局面，只有在供应链中使用信贷组合融资方案或双重贸易信贷融资时才会出现双赢的情况。最后但同样重要的是，无论供应链成员的风险中性或厌恶程度如何，它们在三种融资方案中的定价决策都是相似的。这意味着供应链成员的风险规避对供应链融资方案选择的影响是有限的。文中还讨论了更多的管理见解。
Supply chain finance is a crucial topic. In this paper, we consider that a capital-constrained manufacturer can borrow money from either a bank (bank credit financing) or a retailer (trade credit financing). Our analysis compares supply chain performance under these two financing schemes. Furthermore, we extend our model to evaluate the impacts of retail competition and supply chain member's risk aversion on supply chains, which consist of one capital-constrained manufacturer and two competing retailers. We consider three financing schemes: only bank credit financing, dual trade credit financing, and bank and trade credit mix financing. We find that without retail competition, the retailer is always willing to use the trade credit financing; whereas with retail competition, if one retailer provides the trade credit but the other does not, the credit provider could receive the superior profit. Thus, providing an appropriate trade credit financing scheme is critically important for retailers. Moreover, we find that without retail competition, when a trade interest rate is relatively low, both the retailer and manufacturer could reach a win-win situation in the trade credit financing. However, with retail competition, supply chain members (i.e., two retailers and one manufacturer) will not have an all-win situation no matter which specific financing scheme is adopted and only a win-win-lose situation exists when using the credit mix financing scheme or the dual trade credit financing in supply chains. Last but not least, regardless of risk neutrality or aversion of supply chain members, their pricing decisions among three financing schemes are similar. This implies that the impacts of supply chain members' risk aversion are limited in supply chain financing scheme selection. More managerial insights are discussed.