The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms
The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms
复制标题
可见性对执行社会规范的第三方惩罚行动的作用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3158664
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Kenju Kamei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kenju Kamei
本文给出了一个有第三方惩罚者的囚徒困境博弈实验的结果。第三方惩罚经常被观察到，与以前的研究一致。尽管普遍的惩罚，有一个第三方惩罚者在一个组并没有使一个人的背叛实质上是无益的，因为观察到的惩罚强度弱。当一个第三方玩家的行动选择是已知的另一个第三方玩家在不同的组，然而，第三方惩罚是足够强大的转换困境的激励结构到一个协调博弈，通过合作规范可以有效地执行。
This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one’s defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player’s action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma’s incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.