Pollution Haven and Corruption Paradise
Pollution Haven and Corruption Paradise
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1864170
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发表时间：
2016-10
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Candau;E. Dienesch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Candau;E. Dienesch
在本文中，我们提出了一个简单的理论延伸，从经济地理学文献的主要特征（宽松的环境监管，良好的市场准入，高收入国家和腐败的机会）的污染避风港。使用结构性和简化形式的估计，我们发现，污染避风港是不是一个“流行的神话”的欧洲公司，宽松的环境标准显着解释污染子公司的位置选择。我们深入分析了贸易成本的作用（使用各种双边和多边措施），从污染避难所进入欧洲市场的机会增加1%，就会促进0.1%的重新安置。我们还发现，腐败降低了环境标准，这极大地吸引了污染企业：腐败每增加1%，就会导致0.28%的搬迁。我们通过模拟测试这些实证研究结果的经济意义。保护欧洲市场（例如，对进口征收碳税）以阻止向污染天堂搬迁的成本必须很高（摩洛哥和突尼斯的欧洲市场下降相当于13%），更不用说是令人望而却步（中国为31%）。
In this paper, we present a simple theoretical extension from the Economic Geography literature to characterize the main features of pollution havens (lax environmental regulation, good market access to high-income countries and corruption opportunities). Using structural and reduced-form estimations, we find that pollution havens are not a “popular myth” for European firms, laxer environmental standards significantly explain the location choice of polluting affiliates. We analyze in depth the role of trade costs (using various bilateral and multilateral measures), a 1% increase in access to the European market from a pollution haven fosters relocation there by 0.1%. We also find that corruption lowers environmental standards, which strongly attract polluting firms: a 1% increase of corruption fuels relocation by 0.28%. We test the economic significance of these empirical findings via simulations. The protection of the European market (e.g., a carbon tax on imports) to stop relocations to pollution havens must be high (a decrease of the European market for Morocco and Tunisia equivalent to 13%) not to say prohibitive (31% for China).