Conflicting desire and the child's theory of mind
Conflicting desire and the child's theory of mind
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DOI：
10.1016/0885-2014(95)90023-3
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发表时间：
1995-10-01
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
MacCallum, F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Moore, C;Jarrold, C;MacCallum, F
我们对比标准的表征理论的心的方法来理解的心理状态与另一种观点认为，理论的心的任务需要执行功能或抑制更多的“认知显着”的信息。两个实验验证了一个假设，即3岁儿童在心理理论任务上的明显问题并不是因为无法表征他人的心理内容，而是在于任务的信息结构。在实验1中，3至5岁的儿童被测试的愿望在别人的理解，无论是当他们自己持有一个强烈的和冲突的愿望，或者当他们没有强烈的愿望。结果表明，在具有强烈和冲突的愿望的情况下，只有5岁的孩子能够识别出另一个人可能会有不同的愿望。相反，当孩子们自己没有强烈的欲望时，即使是3岁的孩子也能正确地判断别人的欲望。实验2比较了3岁儿童在一个标准的错误信念任务与一个结构相同的愿望任务中的表现，在这个任务中，参与者再次抑制自己强烈而矛盾的愿望。结果显示，在传统的错误信念任务和新的冲突欲望任务上的表现相似。
We contrast the standard representational theory-of-mind approach to the understanding of mental states with an alternative view that theory-of-mind tasks require executive functioning or the inhibition of more ''cognitively salient'' information. Two experiments test the hypothesis that 3-year-olds' apparent problems on theory-of-mind tasks are not due to an inability to represent the mental contents of another, but rather lie in the informational structure of the task. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds were tested on their understanding of desire in others either when they themselves held a strong and conflicting desire or when they had no strong desire. Results showed that under the condition of having a strong and conflicting desire, only 5-year-olds were able to recognize that another person may desire something different. in contrast, when the children themselves held no strong desire, even 3-year-olds were able to judge another's desire correctly. Experiment 2 compared 3-year-olds' performance on a standard false-belief task with an equivalently structured desire task in which participants had again to inhibit their own strong and conflicting desire. Results showed similar performance on the traditional false-belief task and the new conflicting-desire task.