Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration and Regret (Large-Scale Field Experiments in Singapore)
Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration and Regret (Large-Scale Field Experiments in Singapore)
复制标题
野外路由博弈：效率、平衡与遗憾（新加坡大规模现场实验）
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Piliouras
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Monnot;F. Benita;G. Piliouras
路由博弈是博弈论中研究最多的领域之一。这些笔和纸的计算与理解日常交通路线的现实有多大关系？我们专注于一个语义丰富的数据集，捕捉成千上万的新加坡通勤者的日常行为的详细信息，并研究以下基本问题：（一）交通平衡？(ii)系统行为是否与延迟最小化代理一致？(iii)由此产生的系统是否有效？为了以一种符合我们日常直觉的方式来捕捉交通网络的效率，我们引入了一个新的度量标准，灾难的压力，它反映了公地悲剧和无政府状态影响的代价的综合效率低下。
Routing games are amongst the most well studied domains of game theory. How relevant are these pen-and-paper calculations to understanding the reality of everyday traffic routing? We focus on a semantically rich dataset that captures detailed information about the daily behavior of thousands of Singaporean commuters and examine the following basic questions: (i) Does the traffic equilibrate? (ii) Is the system behavior consistent with latency minimizing agents? (iii) Is the resulting system efficient? In order to capture the efficiency of the traffic network in a way that agrees with our everyday intuition we introduce a new metric, the stress of catastrophe, which reflects the combined inefficiencies of both tragedy of the commons as well as price of anarchy effects.
DOI：
10.1145/2764468.2764490
发表时间：
2015-06
期刊：
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
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作者：
David Kurokawa;Ariel D. Procaccia;Nisarg Shah
通讯作者：
David Kurokawa;Ariel D. Procaccia;Nisarg Shah