Cartels, Managerial Incentives, and Productive Efficiency in German Coal Mining, 1881-1913
Cartels, Managerial Incentives, and Productive Efficiency in German Coal Mining, 1881-1913
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德国煤矿开采中的卡特尔、管理激励和生产效率，1881-1913 年
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1160135
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Thorsten Lübbers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Burhop;Thorsten Lübbers
在本文中，我们评估卡特尔和管理激励对德国煤矿企业生产效率的影响。我们专注于德国主要矿区鲁尔区的煤炭开采。我们使用随机前沿分析和一个不平衡的动态面板数据集，为28家公司的1881年至1913年来衡量生产效率。我们表明，煤炭开采规模收益递减。此外，事实证明卡特尔化并没有影响生产效率。控制公司治理变量的结果表明，更强的管理层激励与生产效率显著相关，而债务权益比率没有影响。
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germany’s main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set for up to 28 firms for the years 1881-1913 to measure productive efficiency. We show that coal was mined with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it turns out that cartelisation did not affect productive efficiency. Controlling for corporate governance variables shows that stronger managerial incentives were significantly correlated with productive efficiency, whereas the debt-equity ratio did not influence it.