Bilateral Privacy-Utility Tradeoff in Spectrum Sharing Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Bilateral Privacy-Utility Tradeoff in Spectrum Sharing Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach
复制标题
频谱共享系统中的双边隐私-效用权衡：博弈论方法
DOI：
10.1109/twc.2021.3065927
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发表时间：
2021-08
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
Mengmeng Liu;Xiangwei Zhou;Mingxuan Sun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mengmeng Liu;Xiangwei Zhou;Mingxuan Sun
在基于频谱交易的频谱共享系统中，用户位置对动态信道复用的效率至关重要。但是，无论是主用户还是次用户都面临着位置信息泄露的风险：恶意用户可能非法收集用户的位置信息来操纵市场决策；恶意SU会通过看似无害的查询推断PU的位置，从而威胁到PU的操作隐私。为了在频谱交易中同时保护用户和用户的位置信息，本文引入了一种双边隐私保护框架。提出了一种基于Stackelberg模型的博弈论方法来实现隐私保护水平和用户效用之间的权衡。使用所提出的方法，pu和su都可以最大化其效用，同时将其位置隐私保持在所需的水平。仿真结果表明，该方法在实践中通过灵活调整用户隐私等级，可以有效提高用户效用增益，加强用户隐私保障。
In spectrum sharing systems based on spectrum trading, user locations are vital for the efficiency of dynamic channel reuse. However, both primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) undertake the risk of location information leakage: a malicious PU may illegally collect SUs’ location information to manipulate market decisions; a malicious SU would threat a PU’s operational privacy by inferring the PU’s location through seemingly inoffensive queries. To protect both PUs’ and SUs’ location information in spectrum trading, a bilateral privacy preservation framework is introduced in this paper. A game-theoretic approach based on the Stackelberg model is proposed to achieve the tradeoff between the privacy-preserving level and user utility. With the proposed approach, both PUs and SUs can maximize their utilities while maintaining their location privacy to desired levels. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively enhance user utility gain and strengthen user privacy guarantee by flexibly adjusting their privacy levels in practice.