Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement
Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement
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制裁成本和规范执行
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Cutlip
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Christine Horne;A. Cutlip
本文着重于规范执行的成本与这种执行实际发生的程度之间的关系。我们预测，随着成本的增加，对异常行为的制裁不太可能。然而，此外，成本对鼓励制裁的元规范的强度有积极影响。这些元规范反过来又导致更频繁的执行。使用实验方法测试假设，并在大多数情况下，支持。
This article focuses on the relationship between the costs of norm enforcement and the extent to which such enforcement actually occurs. We predict that as costs increase, sanctioning of deviant behavior is less likely. In addition, however, costs have a positive effect on the strength of meta-norms that encourage sanctioning. These meta-norms, in turn, lead to more frequent enforcement. Hypotheses are tested using experimental methods and, for the most part, are supported.