Inefficiency-Manipulability Tradeoff in the Parallel Mechanism
Inefficiency-Manipulability Tradeoff in the Parallel Mechanism
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3387000
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发表时间：
2019-10
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jerry Anunrojwong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jerry Anunrojwong
大多数学校选择和其他匹配机制是基于延迟接受（DA）的激励属性。然而，非strategyproof机制可以主导DA福利，因为操纵的偏好排名可以反映强度的基本偏好。在这项工作中，我们使用陈和Kesten的并行机制，它之间的插值波士顿机制和DA，量化这种权衡。虽然它是以前已知的，更接近波士顿机制的机制是更可操纵的，我们表明，他们也更有效的学生福利，如果学校的优先事项是薄弱的。我们的理论结果表明，在最坏的情况下，低效率的可操作性的权衡，而我们的模拟结果表明，在典型的情况下，同样的权衡。
Most school choice and other matching mechanisms are based on deferred acceptance (DA) for its incentive properties. However, non-strategyproof mechanisms can dominate DA in welfare because manipulation in preference rankings can reflect the intensities of underlying cardinal preferences. In this work, we use the parallel mechanism of Chen and Kesten, which interpolates between Boston mechanism and DA, to quantify this tradeoff. While it is previously known that mechanisms that are closer to Boston mechanism are more manipulable, we show that they are also more efficient in student welfare if school priorities are weak. Our theoretical results show the inefficiency-manipulability tradeoff in the worst case, while our simulation results show the same tradeoff in the typical case.