THE CENTRE FOR MARKET AND PUBLIC ORGANISATION
THE CENTRE FOR MARKET AND PUBLIC ORGANISATION
复制标题
市场和公共组织中心
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Georgiadis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Georgiadis
不能根据先验的理论基础排除效率工资，需要证据。关于工资对生产率影响的直接证据和来自工资结构的间接证据似乎并不具有说服力。在本文中，我们提供了一个间接测试的效率工资理论，通过测试预测的“推卸”和“礼物交换”模型的效率工资的工资监督权衡，使用数据从1990年英国工作场所劳资关系调查。我们强调的主要经验问题，阻碍了估计的工资监督关系，我们提供了一个新的理论解释的工资监督视野权衡工会的议价能力。我们发现的证据表明，工资和监督的替代品，在吸引非熟练的体力劳动者的努力。这一证据支持委托代理模型，其中许多不具有效率工资属性。最后，在我们检验了工资是否最优地设置在市场出清水平之上之后，我们没有找到任何证据可以排除效率工资而支持激励合同。
Efficiency Wages cannot be ruled out on a priori theoretical grounds and evidence is needed. Direct evidence on the effects of wages on productivity and indirect evidence from the wage structure does not seem persuasive. In this paper we offer an indirect test of the efficiency wage theory, by testing the prediction of the ‘shirking’ and ‘gift-exchange’ models of efficiency wages of a wage-supervision trade-off, using data from the 1990 British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. We highlight the main empirical problems that hinder the estimation of the wage-supervision relationship, and we offer a novel theoretical explanation of the wagesupervision trade-off in terms of union bargaining power. We find evidence that wages and supervision are substitutes in eliciting effort for unskilled manual workers. This evidence supports principal-agent models, many of which do not have the efficiency wage property. Finally, after we test whether wages are set optimally above the market clearing level we fail to find any evidence that can rule out efficiency wages in favour of incentive contracts.