Information, credit risk, lender specialization and loan pricing: Evidence from the DIP financing market
Information, credit risk, lender specialization and loan pricing: Evidence from the DIP financing market
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DOI：
10.1007/s10693-008-0036-5
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发表时间：
2008-08-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Ramirez, Gabriel G.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Daniels, Kenneth;Ramirez, Gabriel G.
我们提供了一个实证支持贷款人专业化的理论，使用最近开发的债务人持有（DIP）融资市场。DIP融资运作的法律的环境是测试贷款专业化决定因素的天然实验室（例如：G.贷款人选择）。我们发现，贷款人的选择不是由信用风险，而是由信息的考虑，这种贷款专业化的贷款定价效果。简而言之，银行（非银行贷款人）以较低（较高）的贷款利差向透明度更高（更低）的公司贷款。我们的研究结果是一致的解释，银行提供重要和有用的服务。
We provide an empirical support for theories of lender specialization using the recently developed market for Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing. The legal environment in which DIP financing operates represents a natural laboratory for testing determinants of lending specialization (e. g. lender choice). We find that the choice of lender is not driven by credit risk, but by information considerations and that this lending specialization has loan pricing effects. In short, banks (non-bank lenders) lend to more (less) transparent firms and at lower (higher) loan spreads. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that banks provide important and useful services.