Adverse incentives in the taxation of foreigners
Adverse incentives in the taxation of foreigners
复制标题
对外国人征税的不利激励
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(89)90056-1
复制
发表时间：
1989
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
M. Canzoneri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Canzoneri
如果主权政策制定者的税收部分落在外国人身上，他们将选择过多的公共利益。他们目光短浅地认为，公共支出的增加只能部分地由家庭消费的减少提供资金；其余的来自国外消费，他们并不关心。本文以铸币税为例。在有预付现金约束的两国模型中，低效率的特征是通胀倾向、公共支出过多和巨额财政赤字。奇怪的是，最有能力征收此类税收的国家似乎都弃权了。
Sovereign policymakers will opt for too much of the public good if their tax falls partially on foreigners. They myopically calculate that an increase in public spending is only partially financed by a decrease in home consumption; the rest comes from foreign consumption, which they do not care about. This paper presents an example with seignorage taxes. In a two-country model with cash-in-advance constraints, the inefficiency is characterized by an inflation bias, too much public spending, and large fiscal deficits. Curiously, the countries most able to impose such taxes seem to have abstained from doing so.