Political turnover and stock crash risk: Evidence from China
Political turnover and stock crash risk: Evidence from China
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DOI：
10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101324
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发表时间：
2020-04
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Jingwen Yu;D. Mai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jingwen Yu;D. Mai
本文研究了政治变动对企业特定股票崩盘风险的影响。利用中国上市公司和地级市高层官员的数据，我们发现党委书记的更替显著增加了其管辖下公司的股票崩盘风险，但市长的更替没有显著增加。政治更替对国有企业和非国有企业都有影响，但对非国有企业的影响更为明显。这表明政治更替具有显著的信息释放行为，非国有部门对政治权力的转移更为敏感。进一步强调政治人员与股市之间的联系，我们发现政治更替对股市崩盘风险的影响取决于政治关系的破坏程度。我们的结果对于可选的模型规范具有鲁棒性。额外的测试表明，当政治变动发生时，不透明的公司更有可能经历更高的崩溃风险。我们还提供证据表明，政治变动对股价崩溃风险的影响部分（但不是全部）由媒体对受影响公司的报道介导。
This paper investigates the effects of political turnover on firm-specific stock crash risk. Using data from listed firms and top prefectural-level officials in China, we find that the turnover of Communist Party secretaries significantly increases the stock crash risk of firms under their jurisdictions, but that the turnover of mayors does not. Political turnover impacts both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs, but the effects are more pronounced for the latter. This indicates that political turnover exerts significant information-releasing behaviors and that the non-state sector is more sensitive to shifts in political power. Further highlighting the link between political personnel and the stock market, we find that the impact of political turnover on stock crash risk depends on the extent of the disruption of political connections. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications. Additional tests show that opaque firms are more likely to experience higher crash risk when political turnover happens. We also provide evidence that the effects of political turnover on stock price crash risk are partly, but not entirely, mediated by media coverage about affected firms.