The Co-evolution of cooperation and complexity in a multi-player, local-interaction prisoners' dilemma
The Co-evolution of cooperation and complexity in a multi-player, local-interaction prisoners' dilemma
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多人本地互动囚犯困境中合作与复杂性的共同演化
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Foley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Albin;D. Foley
位于20×20环形格子上的代理与摩尔邻居玩囚犯困境博弈，在博弈的最后一轮中，代理采取只取决于自己的行动和邻里合作者数量的合作和叛逃策略。这些策略(字符)被编码为19位字符串，根据遗传算法进行进化，基于邻居中的代理在基本游戏的10轮中的累积分数进行选择。模拟检查了1000代人的角色群体的演变。即使在禁用选择的情况下，遗传算法也会将种群组织成少数幸存的字符，这些字符聚集在空间上相同的区域中。快速的适应度选择实现了统一的协作。角色在最初的游戏中进化为合作，当五个或更多的邻居合作时继续合作，当他们合作并且大多数邻居已经叛逃时倾向于防守叛逃，当五个或更多的邻居合作时切换回合作。然而，当选择在整个社会层面上进行时，种群的多样性迅速崩溃，单一特征占主导地位，占主导地位的特征的合作是一个偶然的问题，因此不存在进化合作的系统性趋势。©2001 John Wiley&Sons，Inc.
Agents located on a 20 × 20 toroidal lattice play a Prisoners' Dilemma game with their Moore neighbors, adopting policies of cooperation and defection that depend only on their own action and the number of cooperators in the neighborhood in the last round of the game. These policies (“characters”) are encoded in 19-bit strings, which are subjected to evolution according to a genetic algorithm, with selection based on the cumulative scores of the agents in the neighborhood over 10 rounds of the basic game. Simulations examine the evolution of the population of characters over 1000 generations. Even with selection disabled, the genetic algorithm organizes the population into a small number of surviving characters clustered in spatially homogeneous regions. Selection for fitness rapidly achieves uniform cooperation. The characters evolved cooperate on the initial play, continue to cooperate when five or more of their neighbors cooperate, tend to defect defensively when they have cooperated and most of their neighbors have defected, and switch back to cooperation when five or more neighbors cooperate. When selection operates at the level of the whole society, however, the diversity of the population rapidly collapses, a single character predominates, and the cooperativeness of the dominating character is a matter of chance, so that there is no systematic tendency to evolve cooperation. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.