Pollution and Capital Tax Competition within a Regional Block
Pollution and Capital Tax Competition within a Regional Block
复制标题
区域内的污染和资本税竞争
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.558104
复制
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michael S. Michael
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Hatzipanayotou;Costas Hadjiyiannis;Michael S. Michael
本文考察了要素收入税、环境质量税和福利税之间的相互作用。本文构建了一个考虑资本流动和跨境污染的两国区域块体模型。这两个国家的污染是由私营部门和公共部门同时减轻的，私营部门对污染税作出反应，公共部门利用收入和污染税收入。我们证明，除其他事项外，由于跨境污染的存在，在许多情况下，资本收入的纳什最优政策是一个积极的税收，即使不动因素的收入税是最优选择。这一税率随着跨界污染的程度而增加。
The paper examines the interaction among taxes on factors income, environmental quality and welfare. We construct a two-country regional block model with capital mobility and cross-border pollution. Pollution in the two countries is simultaneously abated by the private sector, in response to a pollution tax and by the public sector utilizing income and pollution tax revenue. We demonstrate, among other things, that due to the existence of cross-border pollution in many cases the Nash optimal policy on capital income is a positive tax, even if taxes on the income of immobile factors are chosen optimally. This tax rate increases with the degree of cross-border pollution.