Rating shopping: evidence from the Chinese corporate debt security market
Rating shopping: evidence from the Chinese corporate debt security market
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3221006
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发表时间：
2020-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zhang Chang;Xiaolu Hu;Zheyao Pan;Jing Shi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhang Chang;Xiaolu Hu;Zheyao Pan;Jing Shi
我们提供了发行人如何选择信用评级机构（CRA）的第一个直接证据。利用中国一家领先评级机构的评级数据，我们发现，尽管在大多数情况下，发行人会发布更有利的评级，但在某些情况下，发行人只是选择与其有业务关系的评级机构提供的评级，尤其是当更有利的评级高于发行人之前的评级时。我们的进一步分析表明，这种现象是由于发行人在没有业务关系的情况下从评级机构获得升级时被视为评级购物者而产生的转换成本所驱动的。
We provide the first direct evidence on how issuers choose a credit rating agency (CRA). Using rating data from a leading CRA in China, we find that although in most cases the issuers publish more favourable ratings, in some cases issuers just select the ratings provided by CRAs they have business relationships with, especially when the more favourable ratings are above issuers’ prior ratings. Our further analysis suggests that this phenomenon is driven by the switching cost arising from the issuer being considered as a rating shopper when it obtains an upgrade from a CRA without a business relationship.