The Effects of Crop Yield Insurance Designs on Farmer Participation and Welfare
The Effects of Crop Yield Insurance Designs on Farmer Participation and Welfare
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DOI：
10.2307/1244065
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发表时间：
1998-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Wang;S. Hanson;R. Myers;J. Black
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Wang;S. Hanson;R. Myers;J. Black
采用数值优化的预期效用和模拟技术，对爱荷华州一个有代表性的玉米农场的单个农场产量和面积产量作物保险计划的绩效进行了评估。研究了几种不同的合同设计特征，包括触发保险赔付的收益率指数的性质，覆盖水平的替代限制，以及替代定价结构。绩效评估方面的影响，农民的参与和福利，并在投资组合的设置，期货和期权也提供给农民。不同的作物保险设计的相对性能被发现是特别敏感的限制覆盖水平，保费的大小，以及在何种程度上个别农场产量与面积产量。版权所有1998年，牛津大学出版社。
The performance of individual farm yield and area yield crop insurance programs is evaluated for a representative Iowa corn farm using numerical optimization of expected utility and simulation techniques. Several different contract design features are studied, including the nature of the yield index which triggers insurance payouts, alternative restrictions on coverage levels, and alternative pricing structures. Performance is evaluated in terms of impacts on farmer participation and welfare and is examined in a portfolio setting where futures and options are also available to farmers. The relative performance of different crop insurance designs is found to be particularly sensitive to restrictions on coverage levels, the size of premium loadings, and the degree to which individual farm yields are correlated with area yields. Copyright 1998, Oxford University Press.