Now the Code Runs Itself: On-Chain and Off-Chain Governance of Blockchain Technologies

Now the Code Runs Itself: On-Chain and Off-Chain Governance of Blockchain Technologies
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DOI:
10.1007/s11245-018-9626-5
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发表时间:
2018-12
期刊:
Topoi
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Wessel Reijers;I. Wuisman;M. Mannan;Primavera de Filippi;Christopher A. Wray;Vienna Rae-Looi;Angela Cubillos Vélez;Liav Orgad
Wessel Reijers;I. Wuisman;M. Mannan;Primavera de Filippi;Christopher A. Wray;Vienna Rae-Looi;Angela Cubillos Vélez;Liav Orgad
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
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作者:
Wessel Reijers;I. Wuisman;M. Mannan;Primavera de Filippi;Christopher A. Wray;Vienna Rae-Looi;Angela Cubillos Vélez;Liav Orgad

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2008年,比特币作为一种新型电子货币被发明,可以说是过去十年里最激进的金融创新之一。最近,区块链技术的开发者社区开始将注意力转向治理问题。区块链治理的特点提出了一个问题,即严格的“链上”治理系统与可能的“离链”治理应用之间可能出现的紧张关系。在本文中,我们通过反思法哲学中关于构建实证主义法律秩序的长期争论来探讨这些问题。首先,我们认为,链式治理与凯尔森的实证主义法律秩序概念有惊人的相似之处,施密特将其描述为自我运转的机器。其次,我们说明了应用链上治理时出现的一些问题,特别是基于区块链的系统中的一场灾难,称为DAO。第三,我们反思了施密特的观点,即私人利益的融合是实证主义法律制度的弱点,并相应地假设这是现有区块链系统的链上治理的固有弱点。
The invention of Bitcoin in 2008 as a new type of electronic cash has arguably been one of the most radical financial innovations in the last decade. Recently, developer communities of blockchain technologies have started to turn their attention towards the issue of governance. The features of blockchain governance raise questions as to tensions that might arise between a strictly “on-chain” governance system and possible applications of “off-chain” governance. In this paper, we approach these questions by reflecting on a long-running debate in legal philosophy regarding the construction of a positivist legal order. First, we argue that on-chain governance shows striking similarities with Kelsen’s notion of a positivist legal order, characterised by Schmitt as the machine that runs itself. Second, we illustrate some of the problems that emerged from the application of on-chain governance, with particular reference to a calamity in a blockchain-based system called the DAO. Third, we reflect on Schmitt’s argument that the coalescence of private interests is a vulnerability of positivist legal systems, and accordingly posit this as an inherent vulnerability of on-chain governance of existing blockchain-based systems.