The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors
The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors
复制标题
董事声誉和绩效对目标公司董事流动率和董事会席位的影响
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02115.x
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Andrew Lee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Bugeja;Raymond da Silva Rosa;Andrew Lee
本研究旨在探讨并购后目标公司董事的离职率和董事会席位的影响因素。在成功收购后，当目标公司业绩较好时，更换董事会的比例较低。在失败的收购中，执行董事的更替率较低，敌意收购后执行董事的更替率降低。与事后和解不一致的是，在收购过程中增加目标股东财富的行为并不能帮助董事在未来的董事会席位中获得增加。考虑到声誉效应，担任多个董事职位的董事的更替率较低，未来董事会席位的增加率较高。
This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post-takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex-post settling-up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.