Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes
Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes
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信息和影响力：游说议程和选票
DOI：
10.2307/2111575
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
D. Austen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Austen
本文在一个不完全信息决策模型中探讨了利益集团对立法政策的影响程度和特征。委员会可以在封闭规则下提出一个替代现状的方案。政策与后果有关，具有事前的不确定性。利益集团能够以一定的价格获得与政策相关的信息，并在议程制定阶段和投票阶段都有机会接触立法者。游说被建模为战略信息传递的博弈。信息的价格本身是群体的私人数据，立法者无法观察群体是否选择成为知情者。如果该群体被告知，那么它的信息同样是私有的。这些成果包括：并不是所有知情的游说者都选择尝试直接影响议程;在这一过程的两个阶段可以共存有影响力的游说;虽然信息议程阶段的游说具有遗传影响力，但投票阶段的游说并非如此。
This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given status quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy—relevant information at a price, and has access to legislators at both the agenda setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then its information is likewise private. Among the results are: that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is genetically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.