How Can Functional Neuroimaging Inform Cognitive Theories?
How Can Functional Neuroimaging Inform Cognitive Theories?
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DOI：
10.1177/1745691612469208
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发表时间：
2013-01-01
影响因子：
12.6
通讯作者：
Coltheart, Max
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Coltheart, Max
认知功能神经成像的研究分为两类。第一个目标是在特定的大脑区域定位特定的认知子系统。在本研究中，所讨论的认知子系统需要独立于神经成像数据进行定义，因为数据的解释需要这样的定义；所以功能性神经成像是由认知理论提供信息而不是提供信息。第二类使用神经成像数据来测试认知理论。由于认知理论是用认知术语来表达的，如果这些理论能够对使用功能性神经成像的实验结果做出预测，就必须通过明确提出认知与大脑之间的关系来修饰它们。功能神经成像能否成功地为认知理论提供信息，关键取决于这些补充建议的合理性。避免“一致性谬误”也是至关重要的。当来自实验的神经成像数据与某一特定认知理论的预测一致时，这不能作为支持该理论的证据，除非它能证明实验中可能存在与该理论不一致的其他结果——这些结果如果得到的话，将会证伪该理论的预测。
Work on functional neuroimaging of cognition falls into two categories. The first aims at localizing specific cognitive subsystems in specific brain regions. In this research, the cognitive subsystems in question need to be defined independently of the neuroimaging data because the interpretation of the data requires such definition; so functional neuroimaging is informed by cognitive theories rather than informing them. The second category uses neuroimaging data to test cognitive theories. As cognitive theories are expressed in cognitive terms, such theories have to be embellished by explicit proposals about relationships between cognition and the brain if they are to become capable of generating predictions about the results of experiments that use functional neuroimaging. Whether functional neuroimaging can succeed in informing a cognitive theory depends critically upon the plausibility of such supplementary proposals. It is also critical to avoid the "consistency fallacy." When neuroimaging data from an experiment are consistent with predictions from a particular cognitive theory, this cannot be offered as evidence in support of that theory unless it can be shown that there were possible other outcomes of the experiment that are inconsistent with the theory-outcomes that would have falsified predictions from the theory had they been obtained.