The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2015.11.014
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发表时间：
2016-05-16
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Martin-Herran, Guiomar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Benchekroun, Hassan;Martin-Herran, Guiomar
我们研究跨界污染游戏中预见的影响;即一个国家控制其排放的能力，同时考虑到当前排放和未来污染水平之间的关系，从而影响未来的损害。我们表明，当所有国家都近视时，即，选择“自由放任”政策，他们的收益小于所有国家都有远见时，即，不近视。然而，在这种情况下，一个短视的国家变得有远见，我们表明，福利的影响，该国的远见是模糊的。对于获得远见的国家来说，远见可能会减少福利，这是由于其他有远见的国家对该国获得远见的反应。有远见的国家减少了排放，而其他有远见的国家则增加了排放。对总排放量的总体影响尚不明确。此外，我们的研究结果表明，激励机制，涉及一个非常小的（可能是零）的现值转移，可以发挥重要作用，诱导一个国家采取有远见的行为，减少短视的国家数量。这些激励措施将补偿短视国家因获得远见而遭受的短期损失，并可由该国从长期远见中获得的收益予以补偿。(C)2015爱思唯尔B. V.保留所有权利。
We study the impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game; i.e. the ability of a country to control its emissions taking into account the relationship between current emissions and future levels of pollution and thus on future damages. We show that when all countries are myopic, i.e., choose the 'laisser-faire' policy, their payoffs are smaller than when all countries are farsighted, i.e., non-myopic. However, in the case where one myopic country becomes farsighted we show that the welfare impact of foresight on that country is ambiguous. Foresight may be welfare reducing for the country that acquires it. This is due to the reaction of the other farsighted countries to that country's acquisition of foresight. The country that acquires foresight reduces its emissions while the other farsighted countries extend their emissions. The overall impact on total emissions is ambiguous. Moreover, our results suggest that incentive mechanisms, that involve a very small (possibly zero) present value of transfers, can play an important role in inducing a country to adopt a farsighted behavior and diminishing the number of myopic countries. These incentives would compensate the myopic country for the short-run losses incurred from the acquisition of foresight and can be reimbursed by that country from the gains from foresight that it enjoys in the long run. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.