When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects
When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2727301
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发表时间：
2019-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Jachimowicz;Shannon Duncan;E. Weber;Eric J. Johnson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Jachimowicz;Shannon Duncan;E. Weber;Eric J. Johnson
当人们用一个预先选择的选项--“默认”--做决定时，他们更有可能选择那个选项。由于默认设置易于实现，因此它们构成了CHOICE体系结构工具箱中使用最广泛的工具之一。然而，要决定何时应该使用违约而不是其他选择架构工具，政策制定者必须知道违约的有效性，以及它们的有效性何时和为什么会有所不同。为了回答这些问题，我们对符合我们标准的58项默认研究(汇集n=73,675项)进行了文献搜索和荟萃分析。虽然我们的分析揭示了违约的相当大的影响(d=0.68，95%可信区间=0.53-0.83)，但我们也发现了实质性的差异：大多数违约研究发现了积极的影响，但有几项没有发现显著的影响，甚至有两个研究显示了负面影响。为了解释这种差异，我们利用现有的理论框架来检查有效性差异的驱动因素。我们的分析揭示了部分解释违约有效性差异的两个因素。首先，我们发现消费者领域的默认更有效，而环境领域的默认更不有效。其次，我们发现，当它们通过背书(被视为传达选择架构师认为决策者应该做的事情的默认设置)或捐赠(被视为反映现状的默认设置)进行操作时，违约更有效。最后，我们讨论了未来违约研究项目的可能方向，包括潜在的额外主持人，以及对对违约的实施和评估感兴趣的政策制定者的影响。
When people make decisions with a pre-selected choice option – a ‘default’ – they are more likely to select that option. Because defaults are easy to implement, they constitute one of the most widely employed tools in the choice architecture toolbox. However, to decide when defaults should be used instead of other choice architecture tools, policy-makers must know how effective defaults are and when and why their effectiveness varies. To answer these questions, we conduct a literature search and meta-analysis of the 58 default studies (pooled n = 73,675) that fit our criteria. While our analysis reveals a considerable influence of defaults (d = 0.68, 95% confidence interval = 0.53–0.83), we also discover substantial variation: the majority of default studies find positive effects, but several do not find a significant effect, and two even demonstrate negative effects. To explain this variability, we draw on existing theoretical frameworks to examine the drivers of disparity in effectiveness. Our analysis reveals two factors that partially account for the variability in defaults’ effectiveness. First, we find that defaults in consumer domains are more effective and in environmental domains are less effective. Second, we find that defaults are more effective when they operate through endorsement (defaults that are seen as conveying what the choice architect thinks the decision-maker should do) or endowment (defaults that are seen as reflecting the status quo). We end with a discussion of possible directions for a future research program on defaults, including potential additional moderators, and implications for policy-makers interested in the implementation and evaluation of defaults.