Voluntary disclosures around share repurchases
Voluntary disclosures around share repurchases
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.004
复制
发表时间：
2008-07
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
P. Brockman;Inder K. Khurana;Xiumin Martin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Brockman;Inder K. Khurana;Xiumin Martin
经理人在回购股票前的一个月内增加了坏消息公告的频率和幅度。在较小程度上，他们也增加了回购后1个月内好消息公告的频率和幅度。这些结果与Barclay和Smith的[1988]一致。公司支付政策：现金股利与公开市场回购。Journal of Financial Economics 22，61-82.]推测股票回购，不像股息，创造激励管理人员操纵信息流。我们进一步表明，经理人提供向下偏置的盈利预测回购前，经理人的倾向，以改变信息流之前，股票回购增加与他们的所有者权益的公司。
Managers increase the frequency and magnitude of bad news announcements during the 1-month period prior to repurchasing shares. To a lesser extent, they also increase the frequency and magnitude of good news announcements during the 1-month period following their repurchases. These results are consistent with Barclay and Smith's [1988. Corporate payout policy: Cash dividends versus open-market repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 61–82.] conjecture that share repurchases, unlike dividends, create incentives for managers to manipulate information flows. We further show that managers provide downward-biased earnings forecasts before repurchases and that managers’ propensity to alter information flows prior to share repurchases increases with their ownership interest in the firm.