Security and composition of multiparty cryptographic protocols
Security and composition of multiparty cryptographic protocols
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DOI：
10.1007/s001459910006
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发表时间：
2000-12-01
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Canetti, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Canetti, R
我们提出了多方密码协议安全性的一般定义，重点是评估各方输入的概率函数的任务。我们表明，相对于这些定义，安全性是保存在一个自然的组合操作。的定义遵循已知的定义的一般范式，但引入了一些实质性的修改和简化。组合操作是自然的“子程序替换”操作，形式化的Micali和Rogaway.We考虑多方协议的几个标准设置，包括窃听，拜占庭，非自适应和自适应对手的情况下，以及信息理论和计算模型。特别是，在计算模型中，我们提供了第一个定义的安全协议，被证明是保存在组合。
We present general definitions of security for multiparty cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation.The definitions follow the general paradigm of known definitions; yet some substantial modifications and simplifications are introduced. The composition operation is the natural "subroutine substitution" operation, formalized by Micali and Rogaway.We consider several standard settings for multiparty protocols, including the cases of eavesdropping, Byzantine, nonadaptive and adaptive adversaries, as well as the information-theoretic and the computational models. In particular, in the computational model we provide the first definition of security of protocols that is shown to be preserved under composition.