Supporting the externality of intermittency in policies for renewable energy
Supporting the externality of intermittency in policies for renewable energy
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DOI：
10.1016/j.enpol.2015.07.036
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
9
通讯作者：
D. Bunn;J. Muñoz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Bunn;J. Muñoz
我们分析了在自由化的电力市场中支持可再生能源和资源充足性的联合问题，并提出了一个详细的基于模型的两种替代政策的比较。我们是在英国市场的背景下进行这一工作的。我们展示了如何，在其他条件不变的情况下，逐步取代煤炭与风施加额外的储备成本，并评估替代方法来满足这一点，无论是通过由客户资助的容量支付，或可靠性要求的风力发电机与资本成本或能源馈入补贴。我们考虑了市场集中的现实，以及务实的监管在多大程度上可以允许价格上升到边际成本以上，以减少直接补贴和复杂的市场设计的程度，我们还评估了在逐步用风能替代煤炭的情况下，当安全性由额外的调峰天然气维持时，碳减排的隐含成本。我们发现，通过资本津贴，而不是能源市场的支持是更有效的。
We analyse the joint problem of supporting renewables and resource adequacy in a liberalised electricity market and present a detailed model-based comparison of two alternative policies. We undertake this in the context of the British market. We show how, ceteris paribus, the progressive replacement of coal with wind imposes extra costs of reserve and evaluate alternative way to meet this, whether through capacity payments funded by customers, or a reliability requirement on wind generators with capital cost or energy feed-in subsidies. We consider the reality of market concentration and the extent to which pragmatic regulation could allow prices to rise above marginal cost to reduce the extent of direct subsidies and complex market designs. We also evaluate the implied cost of carbon reduction in a progressive replacement of coal with wind, when the security is maintained by extra peaking gas. We find that support through capital allowances rather than the energy market is more efficient.