Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration
Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration
复制标题
双要约仲裁的谈判结果
DOI：
10.1007/s10683-005-1469-4
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
D. Dickinson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Dickinson
仲裁越来越多地被用来解决各种环境中的讨价还价纠纷。降低争端发生率通常被列为设计仲裁机制的主要目标。传统仲裁和最终报价仲裁是两种常用的仲裁程序，但对这两种仲裁程序的理论考察表明，争议各方的最终谈判立场并不一致，有可能产生分歧。本文包含了一系列实验的结果，这些实验旨在比较两种常用仲裁程序下的谈判结果与一种称为“双重要约”仲裁的创新程序下的结果(曾等人，1996年)。这一程序要求争议各方在僵局中提出两个最终报价：第一个报价和第二个报价。仲裁员使用线性标准函数评估报价对，理论认为二级报价收敛于仲裁员首选的和解分布的中位数。由于该程序的规则是，要约的趋同会在这些要约上产生和解，这一理论上的趋同结果意味着最终不需要仲裁。实验结果表明，双报价仲裁的争议发生率与常规仲裁的争议发生率大致相同。然而，其他结果显示，有理由支持双重报价仲裁。具体地说，在反复讨价还价时，人们担心仲裁程序的使用是否会上瘾，并使讨价还价者更有可能在未来使用该程序--这是一种“麻醉效应”。数据表明，双重要约仲裁具有非成瘾性，而常规仲裁和最终要约仲裁都具有成瘾性。
Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.