Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression
Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression
复制标题
传染性叛乱和先发制人的镇压
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Ritter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nathan Danneman;E. Ritter
国内冲突似乎是会传染的--学者们已经证明，一个州附近的内战会使公民更有可能在国内造反。然而，当叛军和国家都发生冲突时，战争就会发生。国家当局如何应对国内冲突蔓延的可能性？我们认为，精英们将预见到海外内战改变激励的影响，并在国内加大镇压力度，以先发制人，防止潜在的叛乱。使用贝叶斯分层模型和空间加权的冲突衡量标准，我们发现了强有力的证据，表明随着内战在地理上的邻近地区变得更加普遍，一个国家将参与更高水平的侵犯人权行为。因此，我们发现有证据表明，由于其他国家的内部政治，国家侵犯了权利。此外，我们认为，当局将采取行动，而不是模仿他们的邻国，而是为了避免他们的命运。
Civil conflict appears to be contagious—scholars have shown that civil wars in a state’s neighborhood make citizens more likely to rebel at home. However, war occurs when both rebels and the state engage in conflict. How do state authorities respond to the potential for civil conflict to spread? We argue that elites will anticipate the incentive-altering effects of civil wars abroad and increase repression at home to preempt potential rebellion. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model and spatially weighted conflict measures, we find robust evidence that a state will engage in higher levels of human rights violations as civil war becomes more prevalent in its geographic proximity. We thus find evidence that states violate rights as a function of the internal politics of other states. Further, we argue authorities will act not to mimic their neighbors but rather to avoid their fate.