Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?
Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?
复制标题
DOI：
10.1002/smj.249
复制
发表时间：
2002-08-01
影响因子：
8.3
通讯作者：
Zenger, T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Poppo, L;Zenger, T
信任支持的关系交换安排通常被视为组织间交换中复杂合同的替代品。许多人认为，正式合同实际上破坏了信任，从而鼓励了它们旨在阻止的机会主义行为。在这篇文章中，我们开发并测试了另一种观点：正式契约和关系治理是互补的。使用来自信息服务交易所样本的数据，我们找到了对这一互补性命题的实证支持。管理者似乎将他们日益定制化的合同与高水平的关系治理结合在一起(反之亦然)。此外，这种相互依存关系奠定了它们改善交易所业绩的能力。我们关于这些治理选择的决定因素的结果显示了它们不同的起源，这进一步增强了它们在实践中的互补性。版权所有(C)2002 John Wiley Sons，Ltd.
Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they art designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright (C) 2002 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.