Forms of Explanation; Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Forms of Explanation; Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
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DOI:
10.1080/00213624.1983.11504161
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发表时间:
1983
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
James Webb
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
James Webb
Alan Garfinkel's book argues that the methodological individualism that premises many social theories (for example, competitive market theory; the social-choice theories of Kenneth Arrow, Mancur Olson, and AK~ en; the political-choice theories of Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock) is misleading and inadequate. The thesis is developed by demonstrating through critical argument-using the author's" algebra of explanation"-and empirical examples that social explanations based on microreductions (that is, explanations at the macro level of a phenomenon derived by simply aggregating the rules of behavior of the micro level entities) are often qualitatively different from explanations based on macro level principles. The author's objective is clearly pragmatic: he makes the case that structural (that is, holistic) explanations of social phenomena are superior to individualistic explanations in identifying solutions to social problems. The author pursues his objective using a thorough-going and coherent pragmatic philosophy in which ethical naturalism plays a central role not only as guiding ethical principle but also as an integral tool in developing more adequate forms of social explanation. In fact in the end he uses ethical naturalism as the means to resolve the impasse between positivist theories of explanation that have nothing to say about structural explanations, on the one hand, and the essentially anti-rational ultrarelativism exemplified by PK Feyerabend on the other. Garfinkel considers several interrelated issues on the role of micro reduction in social theory: first, is it true that (as Arrow asserts) group behavior can be fully explained in terms of individual behavior; second, do microreductions answer the questions (and thus serve the same purposes) as macroexplanations; and finally, what role do value judgments play in explanations. Looking at examples from statistical mechanics and biology Garfinkel concludes that, in general, explanation is independent of the level.