The contours of justice: Communities and their courts
The contours of justice: Communities and their courts
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正义的轮廓：社区及其法院
DOI：
10.2307/1963977
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发表时间：
1991
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
P. Nardulli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Tarr;James Eisenstein;Roy B. Flemming;P. Nardulli
对公众和他自己都是完全不负责任的威胁。欣克利的医生和父母早些时候证实了他的精神和情感障碍的严重性，现在他们坚持认为他的病情已经好转，并建议将他‘治疗释放’到社区。”克拉克试图解释这种矛盾，却没有意识到这个问题已经从试图回答一个无法回答的问题转向了另一个无法回答的问题。现在，我们不是试图知道主语在过去可能做了什么，而是试图知道他或她将来会做什么。他准确地指出了他所谓的“精算和临床方法”的糟糕记录，并提出了他所谓的“情境方法”。这种方法也不是全新的；他所描述的这些方面被用来评估危险性。但克拉克确实提供了一个结构和框架，使这种方法概念化，这是一个有价值的贡献。克拉克认识到，危险程度与一个人是精神正常还是精神失常没有多大关系，他赞同法院判决中的建议，即在决定国家可能适当地对他的自由施加何种限制时，主要考虑的是精神病人构成的危险，而不是他的精神正常或精神错乱。实际上，危险程度与个人是否患有精神疾病几乎没有关系，似乎合乎逻辑的是，在决定国家可以适当地对他或她的自由施加何种限制时，任何个人所构成的危险，无论是否患有精神疾病，都应该是主要考虑的问题。但这导致了深水。公民不受预防性拘留是这个国家的传统。社会在不过度冒犯我们的秩序感的情况下绕过这一问题的一种狡猾方法是，允许实际上是预防性拘留，前提是嫌疑人可以被认定为精神疾病患者。我曾希望作为政治学教授的克拉克能更深入地探讨这类问题，并在这些更广泛的问题上给我们一些启发。也许他会在他的下一本书中。
utterly irresponsible threat to the public and himself. Hinkley's doctors and parents, who earlier testified to the severity of his mental and emotional impairment, now insist that his condition has improved and recommend 'therapeutic releases' into the community." Clarke tries to explain this contradiction without realizing that the issue has shifted from an attempt to answer one unanswerable question to another. Now, instead of trying to know what the subject could have done in the past, we are trying to know what he or she will do in the future. He accurately points up the poor track record in what he calls the "actuarial and clinical approaches" and suggests what he calls a "situational approach." This approach is not entirely new either; aspects of what he describes are used in attempting to evaluate dangerousness. But Clarke does provide a structure and framework with which to conceptualize the approach, and that is a valuable contribution. Clarke recognizes that degree of dangerousness has little to do with whether the individual is sane or insane, and he endorses the suggestion in a court decision that it is the danger posed by a mental patient rather than his sanity or insanity that should be of primary concern in determining what restrictions the state might appropriately apply on his liberty. Actually, degree of dangerousness has little to do with whether the individual is mentally ill or not, and it seems logical that it is the danger posed by any individual, mental patient or not, that should be of primary concern in determining what restrictions the state can appropriately apply on his or her liberty. But that leads to deep water. It has been a tradition in this country that citizens not be subject to preventive detention. One sneaky way that society has got around this without offending our sense of order unduly has been to allow what is, in effect, preventive detention, providing that the subject can be identified as mentally ill. I had hoped that Clarke, a professor of political science, would address these kinds of issues in more depth and enlighten us on such broader questions. Maybe he will in his next book.