Action as Abductive Performance: An Improvisational Model
Action as Abductive Performance: An Improvisational Model
复制标题
作为归纳表演的行动：即兴模型
DOI：
10.1080/09672559.2023.2186466
复制
发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Grueneberg Patrick
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bertinetto Alessandro;Grueneberg Patrick
据吉尔伯特赖尔，即兴是一个基本特征的普通行动。在本文中，我们认真对待这个想法。行动是即兴的，因为它是处于：它是由对环境条件的专注反应形成的。这是代理的一个重要方面。然而，它被忽视的因果理论的行动（布拉特曼，梅勒），只有部分解决汤普森的过程导向理论。通过诉诸康德的判断理论，我们认为理解行动表现的即兴塑造的行动在现场。对即兴创作的关注指向了一种情境性的实践理性，它要求意图和行动的相互塑造，而不是由意图单向决定的普通工具性的行动理性。
According to Gilbert Ryle, improvisation is a basic feature of ordinary action. In this paper, we take this idea seriously. Action is improvisation, in that it is situated: It is shaped by attentive responses to environmental circumstances. This is a crucial aspect of agency. However, it is neglected by causal theories of action (Bratman; Mele) and only partially addressed by Thompson’s process-oriented theory. By resorting to Kant’s theory of judgment, we argue for understanding action performance in terms of improvisational shaping of action in situ. The focus on improvisation points to a situated kind of practical rationality entailing the reciprocal shaping of intention and action instead of the ordinary instrumental kind of rationality of action as unidirectionally determined by intention.