Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts
Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.20150275
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发表时间：
2016-11-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Martimort, David
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Arve, Malin;Martimort, David
我们刻画了当一个不确定的附加服务需要长期的基本服务的最优动态合同。引入企业风险厌恶有两个影响。基本服务的利润可以被倒推，以诱导更便宜的信息披露，这种服务：收入效应，减少产出扭曲。企业还必须承担一定的风险来诱导附加服务的信息披露，这种风险效应降低了附加服务的水平，但强化了基本服务的信息披露。这些效应之间的相互作用对扭曲的动态、合同重新谈判和不完全合同的价值具有重要意义。
We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions, contract renegotiation, and the value of incomplete contracts.