Power Analysis Attack Resistance Engineering by Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling
Power Analysis Attack Resistance Engineering by Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling
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DOI：
10.1145/2345770.2345774
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发表时间：
2012-09
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Shengqi Yang;Pallav Gupta;M. Wolf;D. Serpanos;N. Vijaykrishnan;Yuan Xie
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文献类型：
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作者：
Shengqi Yang;Pallav Gupta;M. Wolf;D. Serpanos;N. Vijaykrishnan;Yuan Xie
提出了一种新的防止能量分析攻击的密码系统设计方法。这类攻击通过持续监控进入处理器核心的电源电流来推断程序行为。它们构成了一类重要的安全攻击。我们的方法基于动态电压和频率调整(DVFS)，它隐藏处理器状态，使攻击者更难访问安全系统。为了测试DVFS方法抵抗能量分析攻击的有效性，研究了三种设计。给出了我们的密码体制的高级实现，它获得了足够高的功率和时间迹熵来阻止DES算法中的各种能量分析攻击。在这些算法中，我们观察到能量减少了27%，时间开销减少了16%。最后，对DVFS的硬度进行了分析。
This article proposes a novel approach to cryptosystem design to prevent power analysis attacks. Such attacks infer program behavior by continuously monitoring the power supply current going into the processor core. They form an important class of security attacks. Our approach is based on dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS), which hides processor state to make it harder for an attacker to gain access to a secure system. Three designs are studied to test the efficacy of the DVFS method against power analysis attacks. The advanced realization of our cryptosystem is presented which achieves enough high power and time trace entropies to block various kinds of power analysis attacks in the DES algorithm. We observed 27% energy reduction and 16% time overhead in these algorithms. Finally, DVFS hardness analysis is presented.