Fiscal rules and volatility: the role of stabilising properties and compliance

Fiscal rules and volatility: the role of stabilising properties and compliance
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财政规则和波动性:稳定资产和合规性的作用

DOI:
10.1007/s10663-021-09522-9
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
Kārlis Vilerts
Kārlis Vilerts
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
W. Reuter;Oļegs Tkačevs;Kārlis Vilerts

文献摘要

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本文利用欧盟28个成员国1996-2015年的数据,证实了之前的研究结果,即财政规则的规定减少了财政波动,从而有助于宏观经济稳定。然而,我们记录表明,这一结果仅适用于旨在不受当前商业周期状态影响的规则,即“非周期性”规则。例如,这些可以是预算平衡规则,以周期性调整的方式设定上限。此外,财政规则的严格性使其稳定作用更加明显。财政规则的实际遵守似乎没有发挥系统性作用,即使不遵守规则,也可以观察到规则的效果。总体而言,我们的论文表明,强有力的、设计合理的数字规则可以作为财政政策制定者的支柱,并有助于实现更稳定的酌情财政政策。
Using data of the EU28 Member States for the period 1996–2015, this paper confirms the findings of previous studies that the stipulation of fiscal rules reduces fiscal volatility and consequently contributes to macroeconomic stability. Yet, we document that this result only holds for rules which are designed to be unaffected by the current state of the business cycle, i.e. which are "a-cyclical". Those can, for example, be budget balance rules that set ceilings in cyclically adjusted terms. Furthermore, the stringency of fiscal rules makes their stabilising effect more pronounced. Actual compliance with fiscal rules seems to play no systematic role, such that effects of the rules can be observed even if they are not complied with. Overall, our paper suggests that strong, properly designed numerical rules act as an anchor for fiscal policy makers and contribute to more stable discretionary fiscal policy.